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ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: FLYING CLOSE
TO THE SUN WITH WAXEN WINGS*
By WERNER F. EBKE**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE MEMBER STATES of the European Communities'ordinarily comply with the law of the Communities. 2
Copyright 1984 Werner F. Ebke.
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on
International Law and the Future World Order, held in March 1984 at Southern
Methodist University in honor of the late Professor A.J. Thomas, Jr.
** Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School
of Law. J.D. 1977; Doktor der Rechte (SJ.D.) 1981, University of Miinster School
of Law; LL.M. 1978, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall).
, Although the "European Communities" are often thought of as a single en-
tity, there are three legally independent Communities: the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). See Treaty Instituting the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957) [here-
inafter cited as ECSC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC
Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty]. The
Merger Treaty of 1965 did not merge the three Communities as such; rather, the
Treaty instituted a single Commission to replace the High Authority of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community and the Commissions of the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, and a single Council
to replace the separate councils of the three Communities. See Treaty Establishing
a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, April 8,
1965, 4 I.L.M. 776 (1965). For background and effects of the Merger Treaty, see
Houben, The Merger of the Executives of the European Communities, 3 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 37 (1965-66); Weil, The Merger of the Institutions of the European Communities, 61
AM.J. INT'L L. 57 (1967).
2 The following countries are today members of the European Economic Com-
munity (in alphabetical order): Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the
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For the most part, they consider the long term benefit of
compliance to outweigh any short term gain which they
might realize from non-compliance with a particular
norm, measure of the Commission, or judgment of the
Court ofJustice. The desire for a good name, the will to
play the role demanded, and the wish to conform for the
sake of the common objectives are almost as powerful a
motive among the members of the Communities as they
are among individuals in national states. Yet, not invaria-
bly, the member states of the European Communities, like
individuals, sometimes fail to abide by Community law for
a variety of reasons. Unfortunately, there are no system-
atic empirical studies revealing the motives of recalcitrant
member states. It is safe to generalize, however, that the
motives range from the mere attempt to gain extra time
for the national implementation of the Communities' poli-
cies and laws, 3 to the openly avowed intent to use the de-
fault as a weapon in attempts to secure concessions from
the other member states.4
To remedy violations by a member state of the law of
the European Communities, the Treaties of Rome and
Paris,5 the Communities' equivalent of a constitution, pro-
vide, both on the supra-national and the national level, a
United Kingdom. Spain and Portugal are now preparing to enter the Communi-
ties. For details, see THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC: THE INTEGRATION
OF UNEQUAL PARTNERS (D. Seers & C. Vaitsos eds. 1982); Dagtoglou, The Southern
Enlargement of the European Community, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 149 (1984). On
February 1, 1985, Greenland, a self-ruled Danish territory, became the first coun-
try to pull out of the European Economic Community in the Community's 27-year
history.
3 See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1981).
"When Member States break the Treaty - as they sometimes do quite con-
sciously - they usually intend their action to be only temporary: they know they
will have to come into line eventually but try to put it off as long as possible." Id.
at 308.
1 An often-cited example of this proposition is the famous case Commission v.
France, Case 232/78, [1978] European Court Reports 2729 (commonly known as
the "Sheepmeat" case).
The ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, was signed by Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands on April 18, 1951, in Paris and is com-
monly referred to as the Treaty of Paris. It was entered into force on July 25, 1952.
See ESCS Treaty, supra note 1, at 140. The EEC Treaty, supra note 1, and the
Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, were signed by the same states in Rome on March
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number of administrative and judicial procedures com-
mitted to ensuring the respect and enforcement of Com-
munity law.6 Recent years have witnessed a rapid increase
in enforcement actions, especially those initiated by the
Commission of the European Communities under article
169 of the EEC Treaty.7 Infrequent in the early 1960's,
25, 1957, and became operative onJanuary 1, 1958. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1,
at 11; Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, at 167.
6 See generally, H. SCHERMERS,JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES (2d ed. 1979); G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES (1981); K. LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY 313-32 (1974); FtDERATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DROIT
EUROPtEN, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF COMMUNITY LAW (1980); 2 A.G. TOTH,
LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. REMEDIES
AND PROCEDURES (1978).
7 The following table reproduces the figures regarding proceedings under EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169 and Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 141:
Reference to
Proceedings Reasoned the Court of
Year Initiated Opinions Justice judgments
1959 2 1 -
1960 20 3 -
1961 22 6 3 1
1962 8 5 2 3
1963 8 4 3 -
1964 17 7 1 2
1965 28 5 1 1
1966 25 3 - -
1967 18 5 -
1968 20 12 2 -
1969 46 21 11 3
1970 50 16 2 8
1971 42 4 1 1
1972 40 18 3 1
1973 30 7 4 3
1974 30 11 1 1
1975 60 23 2 1
1976 90 38 6 2
1977 68 28 8 3
1978 100 46 15 5
1979 200 79 18 8
1980 240 82 28 20
C.D. EHLERMANN, Die Verfolgung von Vertragsverletzungen der Mitgliedstaaten durch die
Kommission, in EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UND NATIONALE VERFASSUNGSGE-
RICHTSBARKEIT, FESTSCHRIFr ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG VON HANS KUTSCHER 135, 146-
47 (W.G. Grewe, H. Rupp & H. Schneider eds. 1981). In 1981 and 1982 there
was a dramatic increase in enforcement proceedings initiated by the Commission,
whereas in 1983 the number of enforcement proceedings declined slightly. In
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enforcement actions of the Commission have, by 1984,
ripened into an astonishingly complex and indeed very
powerful administrative means of persuasion and enforce-
ment in the hand of the Commission of the European
Communities, with judicial proceedings in the Court of
Justice looming ahead if political persuasion on the ad-
ministrative level should fail. The Commission's enforce-
ment activities together with the Court's direct and
indirect enforcement rulings must, no doubt, rate as the
most profoundly successful instruments designed to fos-
ter the evolution of Community law and the normative in-
tegration within the Communities.
Rather than plunging into the technical details of the
enforcement provisions of the Treaties and their imple-
mentation, this article analyzes the concepts and pros-
pects of enforcing Community law against defaulting
member states. The primary objective of this article is to
suggest that the law of the European Communities is not
merely entrusted with the maintenance of the existing
political and institutional structures, and with preserving
the Communities' self-contained servile role of functional
bureaucracy; but the law of the European Communities in
general and the enforcement procedures under articles
169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty in particular can also be
used to encourage and to stimulate progressive develop-
ments within the Communifty toward "an ever closer
union among the European peoples."' While enforce-
ment actions may not ultimately transform the present
political system of the European Communities, they may
well be able to create a normative atmosphere in which an
acceptance of the need for political and institutional
1983, 289 procedures were initiated compared with 332 in 1982 and 243 in 1981.
The number of reasoned opinions was also lower in 1983, almost half the 1982
figures: 82 reasoned opinions were sent to the 10 member states, compared with
166 the previous year. The Commisson brought 42 cases before the Court of
Justice, versus 46 in 1982 and 50 in 1981. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 317 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Seventeenth General Report].
8 EEC Treaty, Preamble, supra note 1.
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transformation can grow. Outside such an environment,
the necessary shift in values, behavior, and structure is not
likely to occur.
It is the author's perception that the European Commu-
nities, being one of the world's largest trading units with a
population of over 270 million and linking some of the
most prosperous and technologically most advanced
countries in the world, need to overcome the present state
of political inefficiency and institutional lethargy to be
able to contribute more actively, and more effectively, to
the current endeavor of restructuring and reforming the
world order. 9 For, at a time of growing inequity and
desperation in almost all edges of the world, territorial
and national constraints in political thought, behavior,
and planning cannot appease those who, like me, are
thoroughly convinced that only global thinking and plan-
ning well ahead into the future can achieve a perspective
on human problems and prospects. The same uncon-
strained, reformist thinking is also needed within the Eu-
ropean Communities to revitalize the idea of a European
union. In this process of reform there are, without ques-
tion, still numerous undiscovered possibilities for enhanc-
ing the roles and perspectives of the law and of lawyers in
service to the future, the future of the European Commu-
nities and the world at large.
II. THE RAGING CONTROVERSY: PRESERVATION VERSUS
DEVELOPMENT
Despite their general acceptance of the obligations of
membership, the member states of the European Commu-
nities are apt to be deflected by national interests. While
the member states seem to realize that the economic,
political, and normative intertwining that has resulted
from the membership in the European Communities can-
not be disentangled without self-inflicted hardship, na-
g B.H. WESTON, R.A. FALK & A.A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 1109-48 (1983).
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tional pressures and egoism occasionally become so
dominant as to lead member states to disobey their obli-
gations10 under the law of the European Communities."1
The member states apparently assume that the political,
institutional, and normative frame of the Communities
will prove to be durable enough to cope with occasional,
and usually only temporary, violations. 12 Yet, even minor
10 Much has been written on the origin and nature of community obligations
and on what constitutes a violation of these obligations. See, e.g., T.C.HARTLEY,
supra note 3, at 286-91; G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 278-79; Daig, Artikel 169 annot.
32-51, in 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG (H. von der Groeben, H. von Boeckh,
J. Thiesing & C.D. Ehlermann eds. 3d ed. 1983). For our purposes it is sufficient
to state that the law of the European Communities imposes obligations on both
member states and individuals. The obligations may arise from the three found-
ing Treaties. See supra notes 1 and 5 and accompanying text. It also may arise
from secondary legislation generated by the Communities or general principles of
law implied by Community law. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. An
omission can constitute a failure to the same extent as a positive action. Each
member state is responsible for the conduct of its organs, agencies, and subdivi-
sions. The enforcement procedure under article 169 of the EEC Treaty, supra
note 1, may therefore be instituted against a member state based upon legislative,
judicial, or administrative actions or omissions on the federal level, the state level,
or the local level of a member state. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169. The
conduct of a semi-public institution of a member state, such as the social security
and welfare administration in the Federal Republic of Germany, may also subject
a member state to enforcement proceedings. The conduct of private parties, on
the other hand, is not covered by the EEC Treaty. Id. A member state may, how-
ever, be held responsible for lack of appropriate supervision. See A. BLECKMANN,
EUROPARECHT: DAS RECHT DER EUROPXISCHEN WIRTSCHAF-rSGEMEINSCHAFF 150
(3d ed. 1980).
11 Under the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, as well as under the Euratom Treaty,
supra note 1, enforcement actions may be brought only if a member state has
failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 169-
70; Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 141-42. Enforcement actions, however,
may be based on violations of provisions other than those of the constitutive Trea-
ties. A violation of an obligation under the laws generated by the organs of the
Communities under one of the founding Treaties may also be subject to enforce-
ment proceedings. Violation of those laws constitutes a violation of the Treaty
provision empowering their enactment. Similarly, the Treaties regard a violation
of an obligation created by a treaty between one of the Communities and a non-
member state as a violation of the constitutive Treaty under which the respective
Community was empowered, either expressly or impliedly, to conclude an agree-
ment. See T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 286; A. BLECKMANN, supra note 10, at
151.
12 The non-implementation or incorrect implementation of Directives is a fre-
quent source of violations. For a discussion of the nature and scope of Directives,
see T. C. Hartley, supra note 3, at 81-86, 204-18. The failure of a fair number of
states to implement the important Fourth Company Law Directive, though the
transformation time limit has already expired, is a prominent example of this
ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES
violations not only have an effect on the smooth function-
ing of the Communities on the day-to-day basis, but, be-
cause of leverage effects, they also imperil the possibility
of attaining the common objectives laid down in the three
constitutive Treaties of the European Communities. For,
as political, economic, and monetary difficulties increase,
the number of cases of non-compliance with Community
law is also likely to increase.' 3 Member states may in turn
use the failure of other member states and/or institutions
of the European Communities, such as the Commission,
under similar or even different circumstances as political14
defense of their own default.
The effects that a member state's violation of Commu-
nity law may have on the Community system depend upon
the relative significance of the obligation disobeyed, the
relative magnitude and intensity of the violation, and the
intention(s) of the wayward state. Yet, regardless of how
one looks at the nature and perspectives of the European
Communities, violations of Community obligations, both
proposition. See W. EBKE, WIRTSCHAFrSPRUFER UND DRITrHAFTUNG 12 n.6 (1983).
For a concise description of the contents and purposes of the Fourth Company
Law Directive, see Ebke, Book Review, 37 Sw. L.J. 1217, 1222 n.17 (1984). Dr.
Everling has recently stated that almost 50 percent of all of the infringement pro-
ceedings decided by the Court of Justice between 1973 and 1982 concerned the
non-implementation or incorrect implementation of Directives. Everling, Die Mit-
gliedstaaten der Europdischen Gemeinschaft vor ihrem Gerichtshof, 18 EUROPARECHT 101,
107 (1983). In 1983, the percentage of violations relating to Directives declined
in proportion to the increased protectionism practiced by the member states,
however. Approximately only one-third of the enforcement cases brought before
the Court of Justice still concerned Directives. SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT,
supra note 7, at 317.
' In this context it is interesting to note that in 1983, most of the violations of
community obligations for which the Commission of the European Communities
initiated proceedings against member states, concerned the EEC Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 30 ("free movement of goods"). This is apparently the result of re-
newed protectionism by the member states. See SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT,
supra note 7, at 317.
14 Legally it is, of course, no defense that the Commission and/or the Council is
also in breach of Community law; nor is it a defense that the act or omission
constituting a violation was committed in retaliation for a comparable violation by
another member state; nor may a member state defend the case on the ground
that another member state was doing exactly the same and no proceeding was
brought against it. A. BLECKMANN, supra note 10, at 152; Daig, supra note 10, Ar-
tikel 169 annot. 47-49.
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minor and fundamental, lessen the confidence and re-
spect not only in the law of the European Communities
but also in the Communities themselves. Both those who
advocate a system of integration and ultimate political
union in Europe and those who favor a model that
stresses national sovereignty and looser political union
will agree that even minor violations will ultimately do
more harm than good to the European Communities as
well as to the member states.
The law of the European Communities supports this
view. From the outset, the Treaties of Rome and Paris left
it for the independent Commissions of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community (Euratom), and the High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) con-
stantly to remind the Communities and the member states
of the fundamental objectives of the Communities and to
seek the achievement of those objectives to the fullest ex-
tent. 5 The institutional merger of the Communities in
1965 16 has not changed the outlook of the Treaties in this
respect. Thus, for example, under article 155 of the EEC
Treaty,' 7 the Commission has the duty of ensuring that
the provisions of the Treaty and the measures pursuant to
it taken by the institutions are carried out. Article 124 of
the Euratom Treaty contains the same provision. En-
15 D. LASOK &J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND THE INSTITU-
TIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 105 (1973).
16 See supra note 1.
17 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 155 reads as follows:
With a view to ensuring the functioning and development of the
Common Market, the Commission shall:
- ensure the application of the provisions of this Treaty and of the
provisions enacted by the institutions of the Community in pur-
suance thereof;
- formulate recommendations or opinions in matters which are the
subject of this Treaty, where the latter expressly so provides or
where the Commission considers it necessary;
- under the conditions laid down in this treaty dispose of a power
of decision of its own and participate in the preparation of acts of
the Council and of the Assembly;
- exercise the competence conferred on it by the Council for the
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter.
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abling the Commission to fulfill this function, article 169
of the EEC Treaty'" gives the Commission the authority
to respond directly, yet flexibly, to violations in order to
secure both respect and enforcement of the law of the
Communities.l°
18 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169 reads as follows:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill
[sic] any of its obligations under this Treaty, it shall deliver a rea-
soned opinion on the matter requiring such State to submit its com-
ments. If such State does not comply with the terms of such opinion
within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring
the matter to the Court of Justice.
See also Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 141 and ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
88 which can be summarized as follows: if the High Authority considers that a
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, it shall record this failure
in a reasoned decision after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit
its comments. It shall set the State a time limit for the fulfilment of its obligation.
The State may institute proceedings before the Court within two months of notifi-
cation of the decision; the Court shall have unlimited jurisdiction in such cases. If
the State has not fulfilled its obligation by the time limit set by the High Authority,
or if it brings an action which is dismissed, the High Authority may, with the as-
sent of the Council acting by a two-thirds majority: (a) suspend the payment of
any sums which it may be liable to pay to the State in question under this Treaty;
(b) take measures, or authorize the other Member States to take measures, by way
of derogation from the provisions of Art. 4, in order to correct the effects of the
infringement of the obligation. Proceedings may be instituted before the Court
against decisions taken under subparagraphs (a) and (b) within two months of
their notification; the Court shall have unlimited jurisdiction in such cases. If
these measures prove ineffective, the High Authority shall bring the matter before
the Council.
The procedure under ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88 is briefly discussed by
G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 321-26.
19 The enforcement actions under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1,
and Article 141 of the Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, known in the French short-
hand of Community law as recours en constatation de manquement, have attracted the
attention of numerous commentators.. See, e.g., G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 277-326;
T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 283-323; A. BLECKMANN, supra note 10, at 148-56;
H.A.H. AUDRETSCH, SUPERVISION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw (1978); H.
SCHERMERS, supra note 6, at 200-29; A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAw 94-100
(1973); G. RASQUIN, LES MANQUEMENTS DES ETAT MEMBRES DES COMMUNAUT9S
EUROP ENNES DEVANT LA COURT DR JUSTICE 1-39 (1964); Everling, supra note 12;
de Bellescize, L 'article 169 du traiti de Rome, et l'efficacite du contr'e communautaire sur
les manquements des etats membres, 13 Revue Trimestrielle du Droit Europ~en 173
(1977); Nafilyan, La position des etats membres et les recours en manquement des articles 169
C.E.E. et 141 C.E.E.A., 13 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europ~en 214 (1977);
Barav, Failure of Member States to Fulfil their Obligations under Community Law, 12 COM-
MON MKT.L. REV. 369 (1975); Mertens de Wilmars & Verougstraete, Proceedings
Against Member States for Failure to Fulfil their Obligations, 7 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 385
(1970); Cahier, Le recours en constatation de manquements des Etats membres devant la
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Article 155 of the EEC Treaty places the Commission's
watch-dog function on a par with the executive powers
specifically conferred upon the Commission by the Treaty
and other functions specifically entrusted to the Commis-
sion by the Council of the Communities.2 ° While article
155 reflects the intentions of the draftsmen of the Treaty
of Rome, it says very little about the actual practical signif-
icance of the control function of the Commission com-
pared to the Commission's role as initiator and co-
ordinator. For a better understanding of the Commis-
sion's control function in regard to its role as initiator and
co-ordinator, some historical grounding is not only illumi-
native, but necessary.
1. Initiation, Co-ordination, and Enforcement
The Commission has always been well aware of its func-
tion as guardian of the constitutive Treaties and the per-
spectives of its supervision rights. It has, traditionally,
been relatively reluctant, however, to use its power to en-
force the laws of the Communities against a defaulting
member state.2 ' It was not until the late 1970's that the
Commission, under the presidency of Roy Jenkins, began
to enforce, more offensively, obligations of the member
Cour des Communautis Europennes, 3 Cahiers de Droit Europen 123 (1967);
Daubler, Die Klage der EWG-Kommission gegen einen Mitgliedstaat, 21 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 325 (1968).
20 EHLERMANN, supra note 7, at 136.
21 For statistical data, see supra note 7. See also Everling, supra note 12, at 106. It
has been suggested that, prior to the mid-1970's, the Commission tended to com-
mence enforcement actions only with regard to matters of secondary importance.
See Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 147. This criticism may have been a valid criticism
for the time prior to 1977. Since then, however, the Commission has frequently
demonstrated its willingness to enforce the law of the Communities even in politi-
cally important cases as demonstrated by the actions brought against Germany
and Ireland concerning certain restrictions on the freedom to carry out cross-
frontier insurance operations. See Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany,
Case 205/84, 27 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 233/3
(Sept. 4, 1984); Commission v. Ireland, Case 206/84, 27 Official Journal of the
European Communities No. C 236/4 (Sept. 6, 1984). See also Commission v. Italy,
Case 163/82, [1984] 3 COMMON MKT. L.R. 169 (regarding sex discrimination). See
also EHLERMANN, supra note 7, at 147-48.
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states toward the European Communities.22 The initial
reluctance on the part of the Commission does not sur-
prise those familiar with the nature, scope, and requisites
of enforcement actions under article 169 of the EEC
Treaty. The commencement of an official enforcement
procedure is a highly political step, as it puts the member
state's prestige in issue. This is true for all stages of the
procedure.24 The initial informal investigations of the
Commission require discretion to avoid publicity and em-
barrassment that might result for the member state con-
cerned.25 The issuance of a reasoned opinion,26 at the
end of the formal phase of the administrative enforcement
procedure, is a serious, cumbersome, and delicate task.27
The opinion is to be designed in a way that does not close
the door to the defaulting member state which may even-
tually be prepared to accept voluntarily the position of the
Commission and to implement it nationally. 8 The final
22 EHLERMANN, supra note 7, at 141.
2, T. C. Hartley, supra note 3, at 294, citing Advocate General Roemer.
2- Enforcement proceedings under EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169 and
under Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 141, are divided into two stages: the
administrative stage and the judicial stage. The administrative stage itself can be
subdivided into the informal phase and the formal phase. For details, see 5 H.
SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. A COM-
MENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 5-324-36 (1982); T.C. Hartley, supra note 3, at 291,
302; G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 280-87. In addition to the basic proceedings under
articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty and articles 141 and 142 of the Euratom
Treaty, the law of the European Communities provides accelerated procedures in
special cases. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 180(a), 93(2), and 225;
Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 38 and 82. These articles do not, however,
preclude use of EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169 and Euratom Treaty, supra note
1, art. 141, even where they apply. A.PARRY & ST.HARDY, supra note 19, at 94. For
a discussion of the procedure under EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 93, see
Dashwood, Control of State Aids in the EEC: Prevention and Cure under Article 93, 12
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 43, 53-57 (1975); Germany v. Commission, Case 84/82,
[1985] 1 COMMON MKT. L.R. 153 (regarding state aid to Belgian textile industry).
2- T. C. Hartley, supra note 3, at 292.
21 A "reasoned opinion" is a coherent exposition of the reasons which led the
Commission to believe that the member state in question has failed to fulfil an
obligation under one of the constitutive Treaties. Commission v. Italy, Case
300/81, [1984] 2 COMMON MKT. L.R. 430 '446.
27 G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 279.
28 In this context it is interesting to note that in 1983, as in previous years, the
number of cases actually brought before the Court was relatively low, considering
the large number of procedures initiated and reasoned opinions sent in 1982.
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decision to bring the case before the European Court of
Justice is probably the most political of all of the decisions
to be made by the Commission at the various stages of an
enforcement proceeding under article 169 of the EEC
Treaty, as this decision leads to a direct confrontation be-
tween the Commission and the member state in default as
well as to public discussions of the acts or omissions of
the recalcitrant member state.
Given the political sensibilities of the member states
concerned, it is no wonder that each of the measures men-
tioned have always been thought to be measures of last
resort, to be used only when and if the Commission does
not succeed with its efforts to settle the dispute amica-
bly.29 Consequently, given a choice, the Commission
seems to have preferred to enforce obligations in cases in
which the relative risk of ultimately losing the case in the
Court ofJustice appeared to be comparatively small. 30 As
a general rule, this approach does seem to be legally ac-
ceptable, as there is no absolute obligation on the Comr-
mission to commence enforcement proceedings whenever
it appears that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that a violation of the EEC or Euratom Treaty has oc-
curred. 3' Nor is there an absolute obligation on the part
SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 317. See also Everling, The Member
States of the European Community before their Court of Justice, 9 EUR. L. REV. 215, 237
(1984). The reason for the low number of cases actually litigated is that the mem-
ber states in most cases finally decided to comply with the view of the Commission
or that a compromise was reached. See also T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 316, for
the development between 1959 and 1976.
29 G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 280.
so EHLERMANN, supra note 7, at 140.
-1 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 294; A. Parry & St. Hardy, supra note 19, at 95.
See generally Evans, The Enforcement Procedure of Article 169 EEC: Commission Discretion,
4 EUR. L. REV. 442 (1979). It goes without saying, however, that the Commis-
sion's decision whether or not to commence an enforcement proceeding under
the EEC Treaty' or Euratom Treaty must be based upon objective criteria. See
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169; Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 141. In
exercising its function as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission is required to
use its best judgment and independent discretion. The Commission's failure to
initiate an enforcement action against a defaulting member state on the grounds
of inappropriate use of discretion ("Ermessensmissbrauch") can be challenged
under article 175 of the EEC Treaty. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 175. In
appropriate cases, actions can be brought against the Commission in tort (or, in
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of the Commission to issue a reasoned opinion if the way-
ward member state is not prepared to accept voluntarily
the Commission's view,3 2 or to bring the case before the
Court of Justice if the member state in default chooses to
disobey the reasoned opinion. As a general rule, the
Commission needs to weigh the "macro" effects of a
member state's default on the Communities, their institu-
tions, and member states against the "micro" effects that
the investigatory procedure, the reasoned opinion, or the
proceeding before the Court of Justice may have on the
recalcitrant member state.
In this context, it must be remembered that neither the
EEC Treaty nor the Euratom Treaty provide for sanctions
against a member state which does not obey the opinion
of the Commission or the final judgment of the Court.34
Consequently, there is always the possibility that a mem-
ber state will simply ignore any ruling rendered against
it.3 5 In balancing the various interests, the Commission
needs to consider that excessive resort to formal enforce-
ment actions might do more harm than good to the Com-
munities. 6 In light of these facts, the Commission's
initial reluctance to proceed under article 169 of the EEC
Treaty was a perfectly understandable and, no doubt, rea-
sonable approach of an institution that was seeking to
gain and to retain the respect and support of the constitu-
ency of the Communities in fulfilling its functions. One
European terminology, "non-contractual" liability) for damages. The potential of
these actions has not yet been tested. Everling, supra note 12, at 106. But see
Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 138 n.8, questioning whether in light of EEC Treaty
article 170, a member state could challenge the Commission's decision not to in-
stitute an enforcement action under article 169 of the EEC Treaty. For a general
discussion of the liability of the European Communities, see G. LYSN, THE NON-
CONTRACTUAL AND CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(1976).
32 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 295.
" See G. Bebr, supra note 6, at 283; J.A. USHER, EUROPEAN COURT PRACTICE 30
(1983); Everling, supra note 12, at 106; A. Parry & St. Hardy, supra note 19, at 95,
97.
1, T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 294.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 103-115.
16 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 294.
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can only speculate, however, about the reasons that led
the Commission in the late 1960's and early 1970's to
continue its policy of pursuing its control function in this
reluctant manner.
A European commentator has suggested that, prior to
the mid-1970's, a certain political indecisiveness of the
Commission was one of the major causes for the reluc-
tance of the Commission to commence formal enforce-
ment proceedings against defaulting member states. 7
Given the potential effects that the indecisiveness might
have had upon the lawyers and bureaucrats in service to
the Commission ("Eurocrats"), this may well be one ex-
planation for the reluctance of the Commission. Political
indecisiveness is, however, not sufficient in itself to ex-
plain fully the fact that formal enforcement proceedings
were so seldom used in practice from the mid-1960's to
the mid-1970's. The more important reason seems to be
that the Commission acts as both the guardian of the con-
stitutive Treaties and the motive force of integration.3
Given this twofold task and its seemingly dialectic conse-
quences, in cases of conflicts the Commission seems to
have emphasized its role as initiator and co-ordinator at
the expense of its control function. The Commission ap-
parently hoped that it could best fulfil its duties to the
Communities by assisting in the formulation of future
community-oriented policies.3 9 Like many politicians, bu-
reaucrats, and lawyers, the Commission seems to have re-
garded participating in the development of new
Community law to be more rewarding than enforcing the
existing laws of the Communities.40
The Treaty of the European Economic Community
(EEC Treaty) facilitates such a view. Unlike the ECSC and
37 EHLERMANN, supra note 7, at 139.
s, Id. at 136-37.
s" Id. at 137.
- Id. at 138. See also E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976) [hereinafter cited as European
Community Law]. "The Commission's most significant function is that of 'initia-
tive.' " Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
[50
ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES
Euratom Treaties, the EEC Treaty, with its wide-ranging
concern for the entire economies of the member states,
leaves the details of the policies that will be followed in
pursuing the Community's goals to be worked out by the
institutions of the Community. In this task, the Commis-
sion can play a major role and perhaps has played its most
significant part. Since the merger of the institutions of
the three Communities in 1965,4 1 the Commission of the
European Communities has been able to take steps to-
wards the formulation of common policies in such fields
as industry, energy, research, and technology. By initiat-
ing and co-ordinating the policies of the Communities in
these areas, the Commission has cut across the bounda-
ries of the European Economic Community in a way
which may well be regarded as a further step in the pro-
cess leading to a complete merger of the three
Communities.4 2
2. Consensuality and Status Quo
In initiating and co-ordinating the policies of the Com-
munities, however, the Commission was soon to face the
system-maintaining approach that characterizes the Euro-
pean Communities. The European Communities, im-
posed upon Europeans as an economic and political
necessity, seek to link sovereign states of different sizes,
cultural heritages, wealth, and aspirations. They seek sta-
bility under constantly changing political, economic, mon-
etary, and social conditions in Europe as well as in other
parts of the world. Given the multifarious differences and
the diversity of outlooks represented in the European
Communities, the objectives set forth in the founding
Treaties of the European Communities cannot be easily
attained. The European Communities of the 1960's and
1970's acted as an aggregation of sovereign states inter-
governmentally pursuing their own national interests
under a common roof. They did not act as entities in-
4, See supra note 1.
42 D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at 105.
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dependent of their component parts and endowed with
the status, the insitutional attributes, and dynamics of
legal persons, as probable and preferable supra-national
alternatives to the national member states.43 The outlook
of the Treaties of Rome and Paris to the Communities
and the members is perhaps too closely associated with
sustaining particular positions and principles in the status
quo, reflecting the strong sense of national identity and
prestige of the member states.
Like other systems that aim at preserving the status quo
rather than advancing and transforming the system, the
model of the European Communities relies heavily upon
consensus formation around fundamental issues in order
to satisfy both individual national interests and shared
objectives of the member states. The Council of the
Communities, which is principally responsible for the exe-
cution of the objectives laid down in the constitutive trea-
ties, serves as the principal forum within this consensual
system. In view of article 148(2) of the EEC Treaty, the
four big member states, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, cannot, if they
combine their voting powers, outvote all the small mem-
ber states in the Council; any two of the big countries can,
however, block a decision.44 More importantly, the Ac-
cords of Luxembourg of 196645 ensure member states that
43 In this respect, the Communities of the 1980's do not differ significantly from
those of the 1960's and 1970's. As Professor Eric Stein, a distinguished commen-
tator of the law of the European Communities, recently observed, "the Commu-
nity today is an asymmetric, complex combination of quasi-federal processes and
intergovernmental negotiations, with the latter appearing to be gaining the upper
hand." Stein, Book Review, 78 AM.J. INT'L. L. 692, 695 (1984).
44 For details, see T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 12, 13.
4 The Luxembourg Accords read in their pertinent part as follows:
(b) Majority Voting Procedure
I. Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority
vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of
one or more partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will
endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be
adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their
mutual interests and those of the Community, in accordance with
Art. 2 of the Treaty.
II. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation
[50
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when critical interests of one or more member states are
at stake, majority voting will not be used to put through
certain measures.4 6 In the institutional process of aspir-
ing to reach consensus, the role of the Commission of the
European Communities can best be described in terms of
initiative, preparation, mediation, and execution of the
measures and decisions of the Council. 4 ' In this function,
the Commission is subject to the limitations of the con-
sensual system that characterizes the European
Communities.
The consensus-oriented approach of the Communities
results in a constant attempt to seek achievable goals that
are compatible with the perceived interests of the member
states. Such an approach leaves behind the idea of arriv-
ing at a single or exclusive set of common objectives with-
out first focusing upon the interests of the large member
states or a group of member states. The constant need to
reduce the activities of the member states to a common
denominator precludes the members from concentrating
on building a more ambitious supra-national consensus
concerning the direction and shape of a future-oriented
considers that where very important interests are at stake the discus-
sion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.
III. The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on
what should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete
agreement.
IV. The six delegations nevertheless consider that this divergence
does not prevent the Community's work being resumed in accord-
ance with the normal procedure ...
See EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATIES at 249-50 (4th ed. 1980).
46 For a more detailed exposition of this view, see, e.g., 1 L.J. CONSTANTINESCO,
DAs RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 431 (1977); Lahr, Die Legende vom
"Luxemburger Kompromiss ", 1983 Europa-Archiv 223; Mosler, National- und Gemein-
schaftsinteressen im Verfahren des EWG-Ministerrates. Die Beschlisse der ausserordentlichen
Tagung des EWG-Rates in Luxemburg vom 29. Januar 1966, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUS-
LANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1 (1966); EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAw, supra note 40, at 5, 63-66; Kranz, Le vote dans la pratique du Conseil des
ministres des Communauts europiennes, 18 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPIEN
403 (1982). The validity of the Accords of Luxembourg is debatable. D. LASOK &J. W.
BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES 183 (3d ed. 1982); R. STREINZ, DIE LUXEMBURGER VEREINBARUNG (1984).
47 Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 136-37. See also Noel, The Commission's Power of
Initiative, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 123 (1973).
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order in Europe, even for those who endorse the shared
European values and accept the need for institutional
changes and shifts in behavior as a prerequisite to realiza-
tion of these goals.
Moreover, the built-in concept of maintenance places
stress upon technical solutions and organizational as-
pects, and it correspondingly tends to disregard the polit-
ical and normative. Policy or normative guidance is
provided for astonishingly short periods of time, or not at
all, and urgently needed measures and future-oriented
decisions, such as budget reform and uniform standards
of emission control for new vehicles, are too often simply
postponed. This lack of impetus not only hinders innova-
tive initiatives, but also creates a tendency among the
member states to withdraw their commitment to the Com-
munities. As a result, the consensual system tends to
cause political conflicts. The most prominent examples of
such conflicts are the Crisis of 1965 with its "Policy of
Empty Chairs ' 48 and the famous Sheepmeat case.49 Le-
gally, these political conflicts were enormously difficult to
handle. They seem to have contributed significantly,
however, to the new enforcement policy of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities in the late 1970's and
early 1980's by strengthening the Commission's position.
3. The New Enforcement Policy of the Commission
In a consensual system, conflicts create a tension
among competitive pressures that are escalating in a pe-
riod of economic stagnation, inflation, and unemploy-
ment. Under those circumstances, many frequently view
obedience to law as a luxury rather than a necessity. The
member states' renewed protectionism, recently observed
by the Commission,50 clearly illustrates this proposition.
Even minor violations of Community obligations by one
or more member states, however, lessen the confidence
48 European Community Law, supra note 40, at 5.
49 Commission v. France, Case 232/78, [1978] European Court Reports 2719.
50 SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 317.
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and the respect in the Communities. This in turn threat-
ens the prospects of achieving the common objectives set
forth in the constitutive treaties of the Communities. In
the 1960's and 1970's these threats became more evident
for two reasons: (1) the unprecedented growth of the
body of law generated by the Communities under the
Treaties, and (2) the increasing willingness of some mem-
ber states to disobey their Community obligations.5 '
Thus, both the advent of new legislation further imple-
menting the common policy and the increasing tendency
toward national protectionism made aggressive enforce-
ment of existing and new Community law crucial.
a) The Commission's De Facto Enforcement Monopoly
The growing notion of the need to ensure consistent
compliance with European Community Law was accompa-
nied by the gradual weakening of the Commission's long-
standing de facto monopoly of enforcement. Under the
EEC and Euratom Treaties, the Commission shares its
function as guardian of the founding Treaties with the
member states. Pursuant to article 170 of the EEC Treaty
and article 142 of the Euratom Treaty,52 a member state
may bring an action to enforce another member state's
obligations towards the Communities. 5 3 Although these
5' Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 139.
52 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 170 and Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 142
read as follows:
Any Member State which considers that another Member State has
failed to fulfil any of its obligations under this Treaty may refer the
matter to the Court of Justice.
Before a Member State institutes against another Member State pro-
ceedings relating to an alleged infringement of the obligations
under this Treaty, it shall refer the matter to the Commission.
The Commission shall give a reasoned opinion after the states con-
cerned have been required to submit their comments in written and
oral pleadings.
If the Commission, within a period of three months after the date
of reference of the matter to it, has not given an opinion, reference
to the Court of Justice shall not hereby be prevented. Id.
53 For details of these proceedings, see, e.g., Cahier, supra note 19, at 125-32;
Cahier, Les articles 169 et 170 du traiti instituant la Communauti Economique Europienne
i travers la pratique de la Commission et lajurisprudence de la Cour, 10 Cahiers de Droit
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procedures are independent of the proceedings under ar-
ticle 169 of the EEC Treaty and article 141 of the
Euratom Treaty, 54 they have traditionally been used infre-
quently.55 Even the more progressive member states nor-
mally have tried to avoid direct confrontation with a
recalcitrant member state in the Luxembourg Court.
Hence, defacto, it was the Commission which ensured the
enforcement and respect of the law in the European Com-
munities. This de facto monopoly of enforcement origi-
nally led many to believe that enforcement actions of the
Commission were the only way in which the law of the
Communities could be enforced against defaulting
members .56
The defacto enforcement monopoly of the Commission
was aggravated originally by the lack of private remedies
under the EEC and Euratom Treaties in cases where the
Commission had failed to commence an enforcement pro-
ceeding.57 Thus, while the member states could protect
themselves directly by initiating an enforcement proceed-
ing even though the Commission might have chosen to
abstain from taking action, 58 private persons were origi-
nally in a much less advantageous position where the
Commission had failed to enforce directly the law of the
Communities against a member state in default. The ef-
Europ~en 3 (1974); G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 304-09; A. Bleckmann, supra note 10,
at 154-56; Daig, supra note 10, Artikel 170 annot. 2-24.
54 G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 308.
55 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 307; de Bellescize, supra note 19, at 186. As in
1981 and 1982, in 1983 only two cases were brought to the Commission under
article 170 of the EEC Treaty. SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 7, at
318.
- See, e.g., the arguments advanced by the Dutch and Belgian Governments in
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, Case 26/62, [1963] 2 CoM-
MON MKT. L.R. 105, 120-22.
-7 Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 138. Note, however, that under the ECSC Treaty
a member state, an individual, or a firm may bring action against the Commission
to obtain a ruling by the Court of Justice that the Commission has failed to fulfil
an obligation under the Treaty by not making a decision under article 88 of the
ECSC Treaty recording the violation of the member state in default. ECSC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 35. For details of actions under article 35, see T. C. HART-
LEY, supra note 3, at 386-412.
58 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 170; Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 142.
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fects of the control vacuum generated by the unavailabil-
ity of direct private remedies in these cases would have
been less significant had the European Parliament taken a
lead in exercising political control over the member states
by ensuring implementation of the law, the policy, and the
objectives of the Communities. Unfortunately, however,
the European Parliament traditionally has paid little atten-
tion to violations of Community law. 59 Given its functions
and powers, the Parliament was not obliged and probably
not able to counterbalance effectively the dominating po-
sition of the member states. 60 With regard to the imple-
mentation and the enforcement of Community law in the
member states, the Parliament has relied heavily upon the
Commission and the Court of Justice.
b) The Rise of Private Enforcement Actions
Fortunately, the enforcement vacuum generated by the
EEC and Euratom Treaties was gradually narrowed by the
rise of private enforcement actions under the judicial oak
of the "direct effect" doctrine6 1 and the principle of
supremacy of Community law.62 While both concepts
59 Bieber, Achievements of the European Parliament, 1979-1984, 21 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 283, 295-98 (1984); Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 138.
6 For a discussion of the functions, procedure, organization, and powers of the
European Parliament, see EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 40, at 42-59; D.
LASOK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at 124-34; T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at
15-19; P. SCALINGI, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. THE THREE-DECADE SEARCH FOR
A UNITED EUROPE (1980).
61 For details of the doctrine of "direct effect", see T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3,
at 185-223; Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect ": An Infant Disease of Community
Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983); Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law:
The Development of a Community Concept, 19 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 257 (1970);
Dashwood, The Principle of Direct Effect in European Community Law, 16 J. COMMON
MET. STUD. 229 (1978); Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and
Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425 (1972).
62 The EEC Treaty contains no provision assuring the supremacy of Commu-
nity law. In the course of the negotiations of the Treaty, a clause was proposed
which would have expressly guaranteed the supremacy of the constitutions of the
member states. This proposal was rejected, however, as being incompatible with
the objectives of the Treaty. See Wolfarth, Europiisches Recht. Von der Befugnis der
Organe der EWG zur Rechtsetzung, 9 JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 12, 30
(1959-1960). The Court of Justice in two principal cases then deduced the
supremacy of Community law from the nature and the objectives of the Treaty.
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have grown from little more than a legislative acorn, they
have opened fresh avenues forjudicial redress and private
enforcement of Community law. Under the doctrine of
direct effect, individuals may rely upon Community legis-
lation as either a cause of action or as a defense before
their national courts, so long as that Community legisla-
tion satisfies certain criteria of legal certainty. 63 The effect
of this doctrine has been to place Community law within
the context of national courts in actions between individu-
als and member states, 64 as well as in actions between pri-
vate parties. An example of such private party actions are
those brought under the antitrust provisions of articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty.65
The availability of private enforcement actions does not
preclude an enforcement action under article 169 of the
EEC Treaty.6 6 However, the advent of indirect private en-
forcement actions before national courts does not seem to
have given rise to immediate reconsideration of the tradi-
tionally cautious enforcement policy of the Commission.
On the contrary, with the national courts playing a role in
For a discussion of the supremacy concept, see Sasse, The Common Market: Between
International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695 (1965-1966); Stein, Towards
Supremacy of Treaty Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the Margin of the Costa Case, 63
MICH. L. REV. 491, 518 (1965).
63 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, Case 26/62, [1963] 2 COMMON
MKT. L.R. 105.
T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 283-84; Matthies, Zur Auslegung des Gemein-
schaftsrechts im Vorlageverfahren (Art. 177 EWG-P), in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG,
EUROPARECHT UND STAATENINTEGRATION, GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FOR LEONTIN-JEAN
CONSTANINESCO, 471, 473-75 (G. Liuke, G. Ress & M. Will eds. 1983); de Belles-
cize, supra note 19, at 206-11.
65 For an example of the application of the doctrine of "direct effect" in the
context of competition cases, see Behrens & Korb- Schikaneder, Europaisches
Wettbewerbsrecht vorfranz'sischen Gerichten, 48 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDIS-
CHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 457 (1984); Green, The Treaty of Rome,
National Courts and English Common Law. The Enforcement of European Competition Law
After Milk Marketing Board, 48 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTER-
NATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 509 (1984); Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1364 (1984); Picafiol, Remedies in National Law For Breach ofArticles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty: A Review (1983) 2 L.I.E.I. 1.
- Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d'Huile de Graissage v. Inter-Huiles
G.IE., Case 172/82, [1983] 3 COMMON MKT. L. R. 485, 505; Daig, supra note 10,
Artikel 169 annot. 5 at 272; H. Smit & P. Herzog, supra note 24, at 5-336 to 5-338.
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the enforcement of Community law, the pressure upon
the Commission became less acute, enabling it to operate
in a more eclectic fashion. In this context, it is noteworthy
that enforcement actions against public authorities of
member states under article 169 of the EEC Treaty strain
the Commission's manpower and financial resources.
Thus, given a choice, the Commission would seem to pre-
fer to focus its efforts upon cases revealing serious viola-
tions or important unsettled principles of European law
rather than upon mundane breaches of Community law
in order to save time, effort, and money.67 Moreover, the
enforcement system under the EEC and Euratom Treaties
involving the Commission is inherently deficient for want
of sanctions. 68 Accordingly, a wayward member state may
well choose to delay compliance with an unfavorable
judgment of the Court of Justice or even defy a ruling of
the Court. Similar limitations generally do not exist on
the private enforcement level before national courts as
member states are not likely to disobey the rulings of their
own courts. 6 9 Further, the embarrassment of a member
state, when its actions or omissions are declared to be in
violation of the common European law before a national
court, at the behest of a private citizen to whom relief is
owed, might well serve as an incentive to ensure more ef-
fective compliance with Community law.70
Despite the advantages inherent in private enforcement
activities, the Commission must not, in practice, confine
its own enforcement activities to cases of serious viola-
tions of Community law. Certainly, because national
courts have opened their doors to private litigants seeking
to ensure compliance with the Community law, the risk of
detection of violations is increased, and the general pros-
pects for compliance are accordingly enhanced. How-
ever, given the limitations of private enforcement actions,
67 Green, supra note 65, at 544 n.133.
-' See infra text accompanying notes 103-115.
69 See T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 294.
70 Green, supra note 65, at 545.
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such actions are not sufficient in themselves to ensure the
respect and application of Community law. 71 Although
the Court of Justice is now prepared to hold most provi-
sions of the Treaties of the European Communities di-
rectly effective, cases like Cohn Bendit 72 indicate that the
doctrine of direct effect is not yet uniformly accepted
throughout the member states of the European
Communities.7 3
Furthermore, private enforcement activities depend
upon the willingness of the private person concerned to
take legal action. Under the legal cost rules governing
civil and administrative litigation in member states of the
European Communities,7 4 a private litigant often runs a
considerable financial risk ("the looser pays it all"). Indi-
viduals and companies therefore cannot always be ex-
pected to commence an action to secure a member state's
compliance with Community law. Thus far, the Commis-
sion does not appear to be prepared to give financial
assistance to would-be litigants for purposes of private en-
forcement of Community law.75 It is also significant that
the Commission, by abstaining from direct enforcement
measures, impairs the procedural position of the member
state in default. If the Commission does not commence
an enforcement action against the wayward member state
under article 169 of the EEC Treaty, the failure of the
member state to comply with the Community law might
eventually be challenged by a private party in the Court of
Justice under article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 76 Given the
7, See T. G- HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 284; Daig, supra note 10, Artikel 169 an-
not. 5 at 272.
72 Conseil d'Etat, 22 December 1978, [1979] Dalloz 155 (jurisprudence). For a
brief discussion of this case, see T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 235-37.
73 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 224-46; see also D. LASOK &J.W. BRIDGE, supra
note 15, at 173-91.
74 See generally Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate
Governance and the Independent Auditor's Responsibility, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 663 (1985).
See also R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW, CASES - TEXT - MATERIALS 343-44 (4th
ed. 1980); Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1984).
75 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 283.
76 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177 reads as follows:
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objective nature of the procedure under article 177, the
procedural position of the member state is less strong
than in an enforcement proceeding under article 169
which is basically adversary in nature. 77 Thus, the Com-
mission runs the constant risk of being accused that its
failure to act divests the wayward member state of its right
of due process and fair trial.78
c) European Law and Language
Another serious constraint is caused by the existence of
different languages in the Communities, a point fre-
quently not recognized by courts or commentators. 79 The
existence of different languages in the member states of
the European Communities creates unique problems that
The Court ofJustice shall be competent to make preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act
of the Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where, any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of
one of the Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers
that its judgement depends on a preliminary decision on this ques-
tion, request the Court ofJustice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a do-
mestic court or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under
municipal law, such court or tribunal shall refer the matter to the
Court of Justice.
Id. For a discussion of the procedures under article 177, see, G. BEBR, supra note
6, at 366-452; K. LIPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 327-32; T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at
247-82; A. BLECKMANN, supra note 10, at 176-85; Bebr, Direct and Indirect Judicial
Control of Community Acts in Practice: The Relation Between Articles 173 and 177 of the
EEC Treaty, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1984). For a discussion of whether a decision
of a national court or tribunal to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of
Justice under EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177 can be the subject of an appeal to
a higher national court or tribunal, see O'Keefe, Appeals Against an Order to Refer
Under Art. 177 of the EEC Treaty, 9 EUR. L. REV. 87 (1984).
77 Everling, supra note 12, at 106-07.
78 Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 142.
79 But see generally D. LASOK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at 49-66; and from a
comparatist's point of view, see Grossfeld, Vom Beitrag der Rechtsvergleichung zum deut-
schen Recht, 184 ARCHIV FiR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAxis 289, 314-18 (1984); B.
GROSSFELD; MACHT UND OHNMACHT DER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 149-86 (1984).
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are not apparent in other divided-power systems 80 such as
the United States. Language, being a lawyer's main tool,
has a special bearing upon the creation, interpretation,
application, and administration of the law of the Euro-
pean Communities, on both the supra-national level and
the national level. There are inevitable discrepancies in
authentic translations8 ' and also fundamentally different
legal traditions within the Communities. The accession of
the United Kingdom and Ireland, bringing common law
traditions into play made the problem even more com-
plicated. Yet, even within the same legal culture where
traces of common genes exist, there are numerous mani-
festations of mutations and acquired differences. In their
endeavor to give effect to the common intentions and
objectives of the parties comprised in the multi-lingual
constitutive Treaties, the courts of the member states re-
sort to their own methods and their own legal language.82
Law exists, as Professor Bernhard Grossfeld has pointed
out recently, "through language and in language. ' 8' This
makes it at least partially doubtful whether the national
influence can be totally overcome. Hence, there is always
the danger that Community law, in the hands of disparate
courts across Western Europe, will develop along diver-
gent and uneven lines. An inherently consistent system of
law within the Communities thus would seem to be more
a goal than reality, even if private enforcement actions are
coupled with a liberal use of the procedure provided for
80 For a discussion of the comparability of the two radically different divided-
power systems of the European Communities and the United States, see Stein, On
Divided-Power Systems: Adventures in Comparative Law, [1983] 1 L.I.E.I. 27 (special
issue).
81 D. LAsOK & J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at 49-50. For a discussion of the
problems of interpretation of the plurilingual constitutive treaties of the Euro-
pean Communities, see Dickschat, Problimes dInterpritation des Traities Europiens Ri-
sultant de leur Plurilinguisme, [1968] REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 40;
Stevens, The Principle of Linguistic Equality in Judicial Proceedings and in the Interpreta-
tion of Plurilingual Legal Instruments: The Regime Linguistique in the Court ofJustice of the
European Communities, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 701 (1967).
- D. LASOK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at 65.
83 Grossfeld, Language and Law, 50J. AIR L. & CoM. 793 (1985); see also Gross-
feld, Sprache und Recht, 39 JURSTENZEITUNG 1, 3 (1984).
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by article 177 of the EEC Treaty.84
d) The End of the Commission's Selective Policy
In view of the natural limitations of private enforcement
actions and the reluctance of the member states to use the
powerful enforcement weapon entrusted to them by arti-
cle 170 of the EEC Treaty and article 142 of the Euratom
Treaty, the Commission could no longer adhere to its se-
lective enforcement policy of letting violations which tra-
ditionally had been deemed to be less significant escape
through its enforcement net. The Commission was called
upon to take a stance that was more political and norma-
tive than is characteristic of the consensual approach of
the system of the European Communities. The Commis-
sion had to center on the task of establishing patterns of
enforcement at the legislative, administrative, and judicial
levels of the member states to ensure more effective com-
pliance with the law of the Communities. The enforce-
ment provisions of the EEC and Euratom Treaties
enabled the Commission to take this system-advancing
stance as these provisions acknowledge the need for nor-
mative adjustments within the member states as well as in
relation to the member states inter se and vis-d-vis the Com-
munities, without questioning the right of existence of the
national legal orders. The enforcement actions allow fur-
ther developments of the law of the Communities around
the role and the predominance of the sovereign member
states without changing the basic structure of the consen-
sual, state-centric system of the European Communities.
Given the institutional and structural safeguards pro-
vided by article 169 of the EEC Treaty and article 141 of
the Euratom Treaty, the new policy of the Commission of
resorting more frequently to enforcement proceedings
under these provisions does not seem to interfere unduly
with the perceived interests of the member states. In pro-
ceedings under article 169 of the EEC Treaty, the mem-
81 For the text of art. 177, see supra note 76.
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ber state allegedly in default is to be given a fair
opportunity to submit its observations; the declaratory
opinion of the Commission is to be reasoned properly,
and the member state is to be given a reasonable time to
end its violation. These time limits give the defaulting
member state a period of grace within which it is pro-
tected from the threat of further administrative or judicial
proceedings.85 The grace periods at the various stages of
the administrative procedure of enforcement can thus be
used for an evolution of cooperative initiatives; the Com-
mission can try to persuade the member state concerned
that it can attain its proclaimed national goals, such as full
employment, fairer distribution of wealth, and environ-
mental protection, by observing the common European
law and implementing it nationally. The fact that in the
vast majority of cases the defaulting member states have
been willing to accept voluntarily the position of the Com-
mission shows that the Commission's efforts to inspire
compliance with the law of the Communities have been
quite successful.86
The gradually expanding use by the Commission of the
enforcement instruments in the context of an increasingly
sophisticated supra-national European law caused strong
repercussions and an intensive conceptualistic debate
among legal scholars in almost all of the member states.
Whether or not one views this growing scholarly attention
as a blessing, the legal literature spurred awareness of the
enforcement provisions. Lawyers began to become inter-
ested in the multifarious facets of the enforcement system
under the constitutive Treaties. In this context, the fact
that the enforcement provisions are part of a wholly new
legal order which is independent of the national legal or-
85 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 297.
s6 Id. at 316.
87 It is not a coincidence that most of the books, articles, and commentaries
dealing with the various enforcement proceedings under the three founding trea-
ties of the European Communities have been published in the 1970's. See supra
note 19 and accompanying text.
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ders of the member states"8 proved to be equally advanta-
geous and challenging. Given the supra-national
character and the pluri-lingual nature of the law of the Eu-
ropean Communities, lawyers could no longer feel a
champion of their own legal system (which, as every law-
yer knows, is the best in the world); rather, lawyers had to
overcome the limitations of their national training and ac-
quired legal language. This made it easier for them to
disregard unnecessary technical details and, instead, to
focus upon the conceptual framework of the enforcement
system, to make themselves and others conversant with
the structure and the significance of the various enforce-
ment procedures, comfortable with the analysis of cases of
non-compliance, and aware of the strengths and limita-
tions of enforcement proceedings.
4. The Role of the Court of Justice
One can only speculate to what extent this development
has had an impact upon the new enforcement policy of
the Commission. It seems to be quite certain, however,
that the Commission would not have succeeded in its ef-
forts of ensuring more effective compliance with the law
of the European Communities without the affirmative
support of the Court ofJustice. 9 Its power to resort to a
functional and teleological method of interpretation 90 has
enabled the Court to ensure the functioning of the Com-
munities and the development of their laws in the context
of today's constantly changing political, economic, and
88 See, e.g., Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of
Belgium, Cases 90/63 and 91/63, [1965] COMMON MKT. L.R. 58; see also D. LASOK
&J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at 38-49.
89 It is the task of the Court ofJustice to ensure that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaty the law is observed. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
164.
- L.N. BROWN & F.G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES 193-214 (1977); Bleckmann, Zu den Auslegungsmethoden des Europdischen
Gerichtshofes, 35 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1177 (1982); Bleckmann, Tele-
ologie und dynamische Auslegung des Europdischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 14 EUROPARECHT
239 (1979); Slynn, The Court ofJustice of the European Communities, 33 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 409, 417 (1984).
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social environment.9' While it is true that enforcement
procedures cannot be used as a basis for imposing new
obligations upon member states, 9 2 it is this power that
makes the Court of Justice an integral part of the process
of development, integration, and transformation. In this
process, the Court is guided solely by the objectives and
values of the law of the European Communities and is
aiming toward the construction of an internally consis-
tent, coherent system of law and enforcement. 93 The de-
cisions of the Court of Justice have almost exclusively
opted for a supra-national, as distinct from a national,
perspective.
This is particularly true with respect to the Court's deci-
sions directly enforcing the member states' obligations to
comply with the law of the Communities. 4 The Court has
made it clear that national conditions such as constitu-
91 The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, as defined by the Treaty, is not a
substitute for the jurisdiction of the national courts of the Member States because
it is confined to the administration of Community law. For a more detailed discus-
sion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, see H.J. Schlochauer, Die Zu-
stdndigkeiten des Gerichthofes der Europdischen Gemeinschaften, in ZUR INTEGRATION
EUROPAS, FESTSCHRIFT" FOR CARL FRIEDRICH OPHUILS AUS ANIASS SEINES 70.
GEBURTSTAGES 167-91 (W. Hallstein & H.J. Schlochauer eds. 1965). For a general
discussion of the functions of the Court and the effects of its decisions, see, e.g.,
DER EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSHOF ALS VERFASSUNGSGERICHT UND RECHTSSCHUTZIN-
STANZ (J. Schwarze ed. 1983); LA COUR DEJUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTIS EUROP9EN-.
NES ET LES ETATS MEMBRES (Association Beige pour le droit europ~en ed. 1981);
R. LECOURT, EUROPE DES JUGES (1976); L. PLOUVIER, LES DECISIONS DE LA COUR
DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTgS EUROPkENNES ET LEURS EFFETS JURIDIQUES (1975);
E.W. HALL, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1966); J.P.
COLIN, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES DANS LES COMMUNAUTIS EUROPkENNES
(1966); A. MIGLIAZZA, LA CORTE DI GUISTIZIA DELLE COMMUNIT.A EUROPEE (1961);
Lecourt, La Cour de Justice des Communauts europiennes vue de lintirieur, in
EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UND NATIONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT, FESTSCHRIFT
ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG VON HANS KUTSCHER 261-72 (W.G. Grewe, H. Rupp & H.
Schneider eds. 1983); H. Kutscher, Ober den Gerichtshof der Europeischen Gemeinschaft,
16 EUROPARECHT 392-413 (1981); Nicolaysen, Der Gerichtshof Funktion und
Bewahrung der Judikative; 7 EUROPARECHT 375-90 (1972); Aubert, La Cour dejustice
des communautds europiennes, 7 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROP9EN 78-106
(1971).
92 2 COMMON MET REP. (CCH) Art. 169, 3819 4616.
9 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 59; D. LASOK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at
85-86.
- Everling, supra note 28, at 232-33; see also C. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDI-
CIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1972); Mertens de Wilmars
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tional hurdles9 5 and political or parliamentary difficul-
ties9 6 are not sufficient to justify a member state's failure
to fulfil its obligations under the constitutive Treaties.
Although some of the Court's decisions might be contro-
versial, the decisional law strongly indicates that the mem-
ber states no longer have complete control over the
development of the law of the European Communities
and, more importantly, their own law.97
This is not to say that enforcement actions have the po-
tential of politically and institutionally transforming the
present system of the European Communities. This
would require the political acceptance of the need for
such a transformation and of the need to diminish the role
and predominance of the sovereign member states in
more decisive respects than is characteristic of the present
system. However, the new enforcement policy of the
Commission has, without question, broken new ground in
the attempt to construct a normatively integral picture of
a European Community. There is no doubt that the Com-
mission's more resolute enforcement approach, as re-
flected in the growing number of enforcement
proceedings against recalcitrant member states, will maxi-
mize its impact upon prevailing political sensibilities and
the national egoism of the member states. This factor es-
tablishes a context where, at long last, a transformation of
the current system-making consensual approach becomes
a realistic possibility.
5. Legal and Political Limitations
Obviously this possibility is somewhat impaired by the
inherent limitations of enforcement actions commenced
by the Commission. This is partly because of the slow-
& Steenberger, The Court of Justice of the European Communities and Governance in an
Economic Crisis, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1377-98 (1984).
95 See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 100/77, [1979] 2 COMMON MKT. L.R. 655,
663.
96 See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 69/77, [1979] 1 COMMON MKT. L. R. 206,
213-14.
97 Everling, supra note 12, at 104.
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ness and cumbersome rituals for which large administra-
tive machineries in general, and the Commission of the
European Communities in particular, are notorious.
Clearly, an efficient and effective system of enforcement
calls for a swift, steady, and inherently consistent applica-
tion of enforcement powers. That in turn requires that
the Commission be aware of acts or omissions that
amount to a violation of the law of the European Commu-
nities, either on the basis of information arising in the
course of the Commission's normal operations or as a re-
sult of representations made by a member state or a third
party. Only then can the Commission take the necessary
steps. The crucial information does not seem to have
been always available to the Commission in the past.9 8
Even if the Commission is aware of a possible violation
of community law and commences an enforcement action
against the member state in default, the duration of such
an action from the Commission's informal request for
comments to the issuance of a reasoned opinion to the
commencement ofjudicial proceedings to judgment casts
some doubt upon the overall efficacy of enforcement pro-
ceedings under article 169 of the EEC Treaty. Although
the average duration of enforcement proceedings ostensi-
bly has become shorter in the 1970's, it still appears to be
too long in too many cases.99 In addition, in some cases
member states have further limited the efficacy of such
proceedings by delaying the implementation of the
98 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 315. The unavailability of information is par-
ticularly regrettable since the willingness of member states to partake in a viola-
tion of Community law will depend partly upon the Commission's ability to locate
cases of non-compliance. Fortunately, the computerization of the Commission's
registration and control system in the mid-1970's seems to have improved the
Commission's ability to locate and to proceed against violations of the law of the
Communities. See Ehlermann, supra note 7, at 143-45. This development has, no
doubt, increased the attendant risk of detection of violations of Community law.
The following figures reveal the average duration of enforcement proceed-
ings under EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169 and Euratom Treaty, supra note 1,
art. 141:
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Court's judgment. 0 0 In a few cases it was not until three
to four years after the judgment was rendered that the
member state in default ultimately complied with the rul-
ing of the Court. 0 1 In other cases, member states have
even opted for defying the Court of Justice.10 2
These observations lead to the principal limit of efficacy
of enforcement actions: the lack of sanctions under both
the EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty. A recalcitrant
member state cannot be forced to abide by the reasoned
opinion of the Commission t10 nor can it be compelled to
obey the judgment of the Court of Justice.10 4 In adjudi-
Duration in Months
1960-1970a 1970-1976b
From request for comments to reasoned opinion 11 /2 81/2
From reasoned opinion to commencement of
judicial proceedings 11 7
From commencement of judicial proceedings to
judgment 9 81/2
Total duration of formal proceedings 31 1/2 24
a This column covers cases in which the judgment was before the end of 1970,
though in no case were the proceedings initiated later than the end of 1968.
b The figures in this column relate to cases in which the judgment was in
1971 or later; in no case were proceedings commenced before 1970.
See T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 317.
Ioo See the answer given by Mr. Thorn on behalf of the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities on June 25, 1982, 25 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. C. 198) 33-34
(Aug. 2, 1982).
lot T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 319.
102 The most notorious case of non-compliance with a judgment of the Court of
Justice is the famous Sheepmeat case, supra note 4; for a brief discussion, see T. C.
HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 319-21.
103 Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties, if a member state fails to abide by the
reasoned opinion of the Commission, the Commission may bring proceedings
against a member state before the Court ofJustice. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
169; Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 141. Under the ECSC Treaty, on the other
hand, the decision of the Commission concluding the administrative stage of the
enforcement proceeding is binding. ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88. It is then
the responsibility of the member state which wishes to contest the decision of the
Commission to bring the matter before the Court ofJustice for a de novo review of
the case. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88.
o. In the event of unreasonable delay or open refusal of the member state to
comply with the Court's ruling, the Commission, under the EEC and Euratom
Treaties, may commence a second action against the wayward member state, this
time for violation of EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 171; Euratom Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 143. These provisions require member states to take the necessary
steps to comply with the judgments of the Court. See infra note 105. As ofJune 6,
1981, there were only two cases in which the Commission actually initiated a sec-
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cating upon disputes in which member states are in-
volved, the Court declares that a certain act or omission of
the member state concerned constitutes a violation of an
obligation under the law of the Communities, and then
the court recommends, rather than orders, that the state
in default take the necessary measures to comply with the
judgment. 0 5 Furthermore, the Court of Justice generally
does not specify what action the defaulting member state
must take and does not set a time limit for its comple-
tion.'0 6 Finally, the Court does not have the authority to
declare the legislation of a member state invalid, and the
Court cannot quash a national measure found to be con-
trary to Community law.10 7
The unavailability of sanctions involves, to some extent,
the acceptance of the legitimacy of the status quo. The last
vestige of sovereignty attributes to the member states and
their institutions the disposition to make those adjust-
ments and changes necessary to achieve the common
objectives.' 0 8 Given particularized interests within the so-
cieties of the member states, voluntary adjustments or
changes in the laws of the member states often seem too
high an expectation, regardless of how rational and desir-
able the arguments for adjustments and changes may be.
It seems fair to state, however, that the mere availability
of sanctions does not in itself sufficiently assure effective-
ond proceeding. DAIG, supra note 10, ARTIKEL 169 annot. 2 n.5 at 270; see also T.C.
HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 320. It should be noted that in the face of both an
unreasonable delay in the performance of an obligation and a positive refusal, a
second judgment by the Court of Justice based on the violation of EEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 171 may be of substantive interest for purposes of establishing
the basis of a liability that a member state might incur toward other member
states, the Community, or private parties, as a result of its default.
10. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 171 which states: "If the Court of Justice
finds that a Member State has failed to fulfill any of its obligations under this
Treaty, such State shall take the measures required for the implementation of the
judgment of the Court."
10 T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 318.
107 G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 293-94.
1o Everling, supra note 12, at 116.
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ness in terms of prevention and repression. 1° 9 The sanc-
tions available against defaulting member states under
article 88 of the ECSC Treaty"0 have been demonstrated
to be of no practical significance;' "the provisions of arti-
cle 88 have remained "dead letters."'"1 2 Furthermore, the
idea of retaliation which underlies every sanction hardly
conforms with the idea that Community obligations are
based upon solidarity rather than reciprocity." 3 Thus,
the enforcement of Community obligations rests not only
upon the legal or moral implications of the cardinal rule
of international law pacta sunt seruanda, but above all upon
self-interest, mutual trust, and Community spirit. The
phenomenon of economic intertwinement and political
interdependence has been demonstrated to have impact
on political consciousness in a way that has profound po-
tential; 1 4 this phenomenon has created a "solidarity ef-
fect," the significance of which should not be
underestimated: despite the lack of sanctions, enforce-
ment actions under article 169 have been effective in the
great majority of cases." 15 It is to be hoped that this will
remain the case in the future, as enforcement and respect
of Community law are crucial for the future development
of the European Communities.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN
THE FUTURE WORLD ORDER: A CHALLENGE TO
THE LEGAL ARTS
The question of the future of the European Communi-
ties in the future World Order will be settled ultimately by
the cumulative weight of the individual choices and deci-
sions of the Communities' member states, the "macro" ef-
- See generally Holton, The Judgment as an Instrument of State Deterrence in the Euro-
pean Communities, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 548 (1967).
For the text of Euratom Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88, see supra note 18.
G. BEBR, supra note 6, at 326.
112 Stein, supra note 43, at 694.
11 DAIG, supra note 10, ARTIKEL 169 annot. 3 at 271.
1" D. LAsoK &J. W. BRIDGE, supra note 15, at 194.
'- T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 323; Everling, supra note 12, at 108, 119.
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fects of "micro" motives. These motives thus deserve our
special attention. In this context it is worth noting that,
because of increasing economic and financial difficulties,
the member states, like individuals, more frequently seem
to feel a sense of helplessness and futility about their ca-
pacity to influence the conduct of the other member states
for the sake of the common objectives. These feelings
often may result in an increasing willingness of at least
some of the member states not to conform with Commu-
nity obligations, though they may well realize and recog-
nize that even minor violations of the law of the
Communities tend to lessen public and private confidence
in the Community and that this lack of confidence in turn
endangers the possibilities of achieving the Communities'
objectives as set forth in the constitutive Treaties.
Upon reflection, however, it would seem that the "obe-
dient" member states, especially when working together,
actually are best situated to contemplate the probable and
the preferable future of a Community of European states
and to exert a variety of pressures, both political and
legal, that can close the gap between the Treaties' objec-
tives and the actual performances of the member states.
Obedience to law exemplifies respect for the law of the
Communities, for the Community as such, and for the
shared European values and common goals of the mem-
ber states. Respect for the common European law of the
Communities should thus be more than a platitude.
While sharing similar basic values, politicians, both on
the European and the national level, do not always share a
common orientation toward most issues, except possibly a
shared and reciprocal acceptance of the necessity of some
kind of common perspective on the problems and pros-
pects of Europe. But even this fundamental assumption is
not always uniformly supported. On matters of sub-
stance, the potential realm of agreement has been fre-
quently demonstrated to be rather limited. Within many
sectors of Community life, national pressure and egoism
appear to be so great as to become the dominant actors.
[50
ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES
In those situations, the reality of the European Communi-
ties and, more importantly, the idea of European unity is
at the disposal of national forces determining the per-
formance of the member states within the Communities
and formalizing, in political and sometimes normative
terms, the outcomes of negotiations on the supra-national
level.
Is this the chance for law and lawyers?
Let me end my sketch with some brief, preliminary
thoughts on how the legal perspective and legal studies
might be reoriented so as to give concrete expression to
the belief that law and lawyers can make a difference in
relation to the Communities' order, and thereby to the
world order at large which is increasingly vulnerable to
catastrophe and decay. I do so fully aware that political
positions of the member states are fairly durable and not
prone to even modest change, not even for the benefit of
the common objectives of the European Communities.
And I am well aware that law and lawyers cannot supply
the proverbial "political will" on the part of the govern-
ments of the member states." 6 I am also well aware that
given the consensuality of the system, the position of the
member states inter se and vis-d-vis the Communities, as
stated in the founding Treaties, will remain static unless
there is unanimous desire for change. ' 7 And I do so see-
ing quite clearly that a pessimism about the future is be-
ginning to prevail all around us and that this pessimism is
itself a major obstacle to progress within the European
Communities as well as in other parts of the world. But
one of the fundamental challenges of our times is, I think,
to reduce immobilizing despair and to instill a posture of
hope. European unity is not a matter of the government
of the member states alone. Courageous integrated fore-
thought of all concerned, including the peoples of Eu-
rope, is indispensable to progress in the decades ahead.
Given all this, what are the possibilities for enhancing
It Stein, supra note 43, at 695.
117 See supra notes 45-46.
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the role of law in service to the future of the European
Communities? To what extent can we as lawyers help
fashion a response to the challenge of the future of the
Communities within a changing world order?
Lawyers in Community and national government ser-
vice, in commerce and industry, in private practice and
professional legal education have managed to overcome
language barriers and have availed themselves of the im-
portant, albeit imperfect, domain known as "law of the
European Communities" or "European law." This, to-
gether with the Community spirit that many lawyers have
acquired, has enabled lawyers to shape and facilitate a
beneficial type of development, of which the recognition
of the supremacy of European law" 18 and of the direct ef-
fect of important provisions of the constitutive Treaties" 19
are probably the most important examples. This demon-
strates that while the language of law tends to be static,
lawyers need not be. A lawyer's skills, knowledge, and in-
fluence can become relevant, both in his professional and
personal endeavors, through conscious, community-ad-
vancing and future-oriented construction of the law, legal
and general education, and peaceful political actions.
This task will be easier than many may expect, as, to a
large extent, it requires the type of analytical and concep-
tual thinking and weighing of interests for which lawyers
are well trained. Through exercising analytical ingenuity
and engaging in creative imagination, 20 lawyers can play
a significant role regarding a credible strategy of re-
forming the European Communities. New modes of
thinking and new orientations are needed if the law of the
Communities and lawyers are to achieve a dynamic, pro-
gressive perspective.
Such an outlook is particularly essential for interested
jurisprudential scholars. They need to concentrate their
1' See supra note 62.
119 See supra note 61.
120 See generally James B. White's challenging studies in the nature of legal
thought and expression, J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
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legal analysis on a period of time long enough to be in-
dependent of current contexts of choice, yet short enough
to engage the concerns of policy and decision makers. A
lawyer's reformist thinking should start from the premise
that many of the assumptions, policies, and conditions
that have characterized relations of the member states in-
terse and vis-a-vis the Communities during the past quarter
of a century are inadequate to the demands of today and
the foreseeable demands of the foreseeable future.
Thinking should be shaped by a normative and political
orientation toward present and possible future arrange-
ments of power, resources, and authority. On such an in-
tellectual basis, a new conceptiQn of European
Community can begin to emerge that is sensitive to the
role of thought and reason in accomplishing an essential
reunion between the objectives of the European Commu-
nities and the actual performance of the member states.
In their future-oriented analysis, legal scholars should
not, however, overlook historical perspectives. On the
contrary, by locating themselves and the subject of their
concern in the flow of time, writers will be freed from
their preoccupation with current political problems and
dilemmas. They will then approach the necessary process
of advancing and transforming the European Communi-
ties from a slightly different perspective, which may prove
to be beneficial to both the Communities and the member
states.
Legal educators, too, are called upon in our present
time of transition. Legal education should aim at the for-
mation of a European constituency of lawyers who com-
plement their national citizenship with an identity as
European citizens. Such an expansion of identity and loy-
alty patterns is critical for transition to European unity.
For, which view of the appropriate role of the law and of
the perspectives of the Communities will prevail, is largely
in the hand of lawyers who, in their capacities as adminis-
trators, legislators, judges, practitioners, or scholars, un-
derstand that law must contribute to, not hinder, the
1985] 723
724 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
solutions of the problems of today and prospects for
tomorrow.
Acquisition of a new European outlook and its embodi-
ment in thought, reasoning and conduct is necessary.
Transnational actors, such as ecological groups, are al-
ready manifesting their primary allegiance to values that
are European, and even global in nature, with no territo-
rial or national constraints. With the same spirit in mind,
lawyers should develop new perceptions of what is
needed to make the Communities work and to evolve, as a
dynamic political system, in a manner consistent with the
shared European values and a general attitude of hope
about the future. Such reorientation requires fundamen-
tal shifts in political values and behavior throughout the
European Communities. The sooner we gain a clear vi-
sion of how to encourage effectively these shifts, the bet-
ter our chances of contributing effectively to the creation
of "an ever closer union among the European peoples"' 2 '
whose voice in the international concert will be strong
enough to be heard adequately in the endeavor of creat-
ing a more peaceful, equitable, and socially as well as eco-
nomically just world order. 22
IV. CONCLUSION
Some will wonder, of course, whether the stance ex-
pressed in this article is not naive and sentimental, a re-
flection of early conceptions of a dynamic European
Community, moving inexorably toward ever closer polit-
ical, institutional, and normative integration. Admittedly,
given today's political climate in Europe, a new movement
toward a European federation seems rather limited at this
time. So why, then, should we as lawyers become more
12, EEC Treaty, Preamble, supra note 1. For a discussion of the political and
legal difficulties associated with the Draft Establishing the European Union, see
Lodge, Freestone & Davidson, Some Problems of the Draft Treaty on European Union, 9
EUR. L. REV. 387-400 (1984).
122 See also VerLoren van Themaat, The Impact of Case Law of the Court of Justice of
the Europe'an Communities on the Economic World Order, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1422-38
(1984).
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active, here and now? The short answer to this question
is that our sense of self-interest compels that we try. The
more involved response is that, like Icarus, we are flying
close to the sun with waxen wings.

